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Challenging The Paternity of Children Born
During Wedlock: An Analysis of
Pennsylvania Law Regarding the Effects of
the Doctrines of Presumption of Legitimacy
and Paternity By Estoppel on the
Admissibility of Blood Tests to Determine
Paternity
I. Introduction
Actions challenging the paternity of a child born during the
course of a marriage have historically been a troublesome question
for the courts to answer.' At common law, a child born during
wedlock was presumed to be a product of the marriage unless the
party questioning paternity could prove that the husband either did
not have access to his wife during the period of conception or that
the husband was impotent.2 However, even if the challenger is
successful in overcoming the presumption of legitimacy, under
certain circumstances a party may be estopped from questioning
paternity if the husband in question had continuously held the child
out as his own.3
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently summarized the
effect that the principles of presumption of legitimacy and "paterni-
ty by estoppel"4 have had on the determination of paternity.5 The
1. Commonwealth ex rel. Goldman v. Goldman, 184 A.2d 351, 354 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1962).
2. Id. At early common law, proving that a husband did not have access to his wife
meant proving that the husband "was not within the four seas which bounded the kingdom"
at the time of his wife's conception. Id. Later in common law, non-access was able to be
proven by showing that the husband and wife lived so far apart from each other that access
was doubtful. Commonwealth v. Shepherd, 6 Binn. 283, 286 (Pa. 1814).
3. Gulla v. Fitzpatrick, 596 A.2d 851, 855 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
4. Id.
5. Jones v. Trojak, 634 A.2d 201, 206 (Pa. 1993).
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court explained that the starting point in an action to determine the
paternity of a child born during wedlock is the presumption of
legitimacy.6 This presumption of paternity can only be overcome
by proof of non-access, that is, lack of sexual intercourse or proof
of impotence.7 Only when the presumption of legitimacy has been
successfully rebutted may a court order the parties involved to
submit to blood testing in order to determine paternity.8
Even if the presumption of legitimacy has been successfully
overcome, a party may be estopped from questioning paternity
under certain circumstances.9  These circumstances include
situations where the parties involved have, by their conduct,
accepted a certain man as the father of the child in question."°
Only when the doctrine of paternity by estoppel does not apply due
to the circumstances of the case, will a party challenging paternity
be allowed to admit blood tests as evidence of paternity."
From the foregoing discussion, one can begin to recognize
some of the problems that the two doctrines present. The doctrines
of presumption of legitimacy and paternity by estoppel create and
perpetuate a legal fiction by presuming that an individual is the
child's father, although it is possible to prove with scientific
certainty that he is not the father. This problem was best explained
by Justice Hoffman of the Pennsylvania Superior Court when he
said, "Any rule of law which excludes scientific evidence and asks
us to rely solely on the intuition and judgment of a judge alone is
undesirable.'
12
Substituting a legal fiction for a biological reality results in a
host of inequities for the child, the presumptive father (i.e. the
husband), and the alleged father. The child has a legitimate
interest in knowing the identity of his biological father. 3  The
6. Id.; McCue v. McCue, 604 A.2d 738, 740 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
7. Jones, 634 A.2d at 206; Cairgle v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp.,
77 A.2d 439, 442 (Pa. 1951).
8. Jones, 634 A.2d at 206; John M. v. Paula T., 571 A.2d 1380 (Pa. 1990).
9. Jones, 634 A.2d at 206; John M., 571 A.2d at 1396.
10. Jones, 634 A.2d at 206; John M., 571 A.2d at 1396.
11. Jones, 634 A.2d at 206.
12. Commonwealth ex rel. Hall v. Hall, 257 A.2d 269, 273 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1969)
(Hoffman, J., dissenting).
13. Minnich v. Rivera, 506 A.2d 879, 882 (Pa. 1986).
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child's interests include knowing his lineal descent-for medical
purposes,4 for inheritance and for other financial reasons.
1 5
With regard to the presumptive father and the alleged father,
both have a legitimate interest in knowing the identity of the
natural father. One should not be forced to provide financial
support for another man's child. 6 Furthermore, this legal fiction
of paternity may result in the denial of the right to visitation and/or
custody for either the presumptive or the alleged father.17 As the
United States Supreme Court stated, in today's society "there is no
room for dual parentage."
'' S
The purpose of this Comment is to discuss how the doctrines
of presumption of legitimacy and paternity by estoppel have
precluded the admissibility of blood tests in paternity suits, the
consequences of this preclusion and the need to change or
eliminate these doctrines in order to adapt to today's society.
Section II will present an overview of the procedural aspects of
blood testing and the admissibility of blood tests in paternity suits.
Sections III and IV will discuss the doctrines of presumption of
legitimacy and paternity by estoppel and their role in determining
the admissibility of blood tests to determine paternity. Section V
will discuss the problems presented by these two doctrines. Finally,
Section VI will propose solutions to these problems.
II. Background
A. Mechanics of Blood Testing
"Beneath all the precision and sophistication of laboratory
blood tests to determine paternity is a procedure fundamentally
14. There are a variety of genetic disorders inherited from one's biological parents.
Knowledge of one's family tree is essential in maintaining a healthy lifestyle. Also,
knowledge of one's line of descent can be crucial in the event that the child someday needs
an organ donor. The legislature felt that the medical background of one's biological parents
was so important that it expressly mandated that the medical history of one's natural parents
be disclosed to the parents of an adopted child. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2909 (1991); see
Commonwealth ex rel Coburn v. Coburn, 558 A.2d 548, 554 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (Cirillo,
J., dissenting).
15. Examples of other financial reasons are Social Security benefits and workmen's
compensation death benefits. Minnich, 506 A.2d at 882 (Pa. 1986); Cairgle 77 A.2d 439 (Pa.
1951).
16. Minnich, 506 A.2d at 882.
17. Christianson v. Ely, 568 A.2d 961, 963 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
18. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), see Christianson, 568 A.2d at 963 n.4.
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similar to looking for family traits in a child's hair or eyes or
nose."' 9 The physical attributes of a child are determined by the
genetic pattern that is inherited from the child's parents; half of this
pattern is inherited from the mother and the other half from the
father.20 The scientific principle that certain components of blood
may be transmitted to a child only from his or her parents provides
the basis for the fundamental blood test.21 Thus, if a child's blood
contains a particular component that is not found in the mother's
blood, that component must be found in the alleged father's blood,
or that person is not the natural father.22 An alleged father can
also be conclusively excluded as being the father of the child if the
child at issue does not possess a blood component that any
offspring of the man would necessarily possess.'
Essentially, there are three types of blood tests used to
determine paternity.24 Each of the blood tests examines a particu-
lar number of genetic markers2 according to the above-mentioned
principles and the Mendelian Laws of Inheritance. 26  As the
number of genetic markers used increases,27 the rate of accuracy
also increases.2






24. Steven R. Lake & Mary D. Paulsen, From Here to Paternity - What You Should
Know About Blood Tests, FAMILY ADVOCATE, Summer 1985, at 41.
25. "Genetic markers are dominant genes or traits that identify genes or traits linked
with them." Id.
26. Gregor Mendel's principles of genetics are as follows:
1. A child cannot have a genetic marker that is absent in both parents.
2. A child must inherit one of a pair of markers from each parent.
3. A child cannot have a pair of identical markers unless both parents have the
same markers.
4. A child must have a genetic marker if it is present as an identical pair in one
parent.
Id.
27. Level I Tests examine only red blood cell antigens. Level I tests approximately 20
genetic markers. Level II Tests examine red blood cell antigens, red blood cell enzymes and
serum proteins. Level II tests approximately 60 genetic markers. Level III Tests examine
red blood cell antigens, red blood cell enzymes, serum proteins and white call antigens
[commonly referred to as human leukocyte antigens (HLA)]. Level III tests approximately
90 genetic markers. Id.
28. If only red blood cell enzymes were tested, the accuracy rate would be approximate-
ly 60%. If only red blood cell enzymes and serum proteins were tested, the accuracy rate
would be approximately 80%. If only human leukocyte antigens were tested, the accuracy
[Vol. 100:4
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Once the blood tests have been performed and the results have
been reviewed, a numerical value, referred to as a paternity index,
is assigned to the results.2 9 The paternity index can be 0% which
indicates with 100% accuracy,3" that the alleged father is not the
biological father of the child.3" When an alleged father is not
excluded, the paternity index will be a number between 0% and
100%32 representing "how much more likely it is that the [alleged
father] is the true father. 33  Essentially, the paternity index
indicates the probability of paternity of the alleged father.3 4
In the past decade, advances in technology have provided the
courts with an additional test to determine paternity-the deoxyri-
bonucleic acid (DNA) test.3 The principle is simple: DNA
printing "resembles a genetic blueprint., 36  The test begins with
the taking of a tissue sample, in this case blood, from each of the
parties involved.37 A laboratory technician then extracts the DNA
from the tissue sample and divides the DNA into smaller segments
through various medical procedures. From these segments, a
visual image emerges much like a fingerprint. 39  Since the seg-
ments taken from each individual are unique, it is possible to see
the extent to which an alleged father and the child in question
actually share the same DNA.4
rate would be approximately 75-80%. If all three systems were combined, the accuracy rate
would be 99.7% which means that it would fail to exclude only .3% of falsely accused men.
Id.
29. Lake & Paulsen, supra note 24.





34. Lake & Paulsen, supra note 24.
35. Sharon Begley, Leaving Holmes in the Dust: Gene Prints Unravel Crime and
paternity Puzzles, NEWSWEEK, Oct., 26, 1987, at 81.





40. See Zearfoss v. Frattaroli, 646 A.2d 1238, 1244-46 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (Olszewski,
J., dissenting).
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B. Admissibility of Blood Tests in General
Blood tests have been admissible as evidence of paternity in
cases throughout the United States for over half of a century.4
In 1961, the Pennsylvania General Assembly codified the right to
admit blood tests as conclusive evidence of non-paternity.42
Commonly referred to as the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to
Determine Paternity (hereinafter "the Act"),43 the Act specifically
provided that blood test results can be introduced to prove
conclusively that a certain man could not possibly have fathered the
child in question." The Act, however, does not address the
question of whether blood tests are admissible to establish a
likelihood of paternity.45
Since the Pennsylvania legislature failed to address the
question, the courts were left to solve the problem. In 1983, the
Pennsylvania Superior Court confronted the issue in Turek v.
41. David Louter, Paternity: The Final Word: New Blood Tests Are Revolutionizing
Family Courts, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 12, 1983, at 27. The first case in the United States to take
judicial notice of the reliability of blood tests in determining paternity was Commonwealth
v. Zammarelli, 17 Pa. D. & C. 229 (1931), in which a conviction for fornication and bastardy
had to be re-tried because the blood test results showed that the mother had type A blood,
the child had type B blood and the defendant had type 0 blood, which conclusively excluded
the possibility that the child was his. Commonwealth ex rel. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 136 A.2d
451, 456-57 n.3 (Pa. 1957) (Chidsey, J., dissenting).
42. Turek v. Hardy, 458 A.2d 562, 563 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983). 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5104
(1991) provides in relevant part:
(C) AUTHORITY FOR TEST. - In any matter subject to this section in which
paternity, parentage or identity of a child is a relevant fact, the court, upon its own
initiative or upon suggestion made by or on behalf of any person whose blood is
involved, may or, upon motion of any party to the action made at a time so as to
not delay the proceedings unduly, shall order the mother, child and alleged father
to submit to blood tests. If any party refuses to submit to the tests, the court may
resolve the question of paternity, parentage or identity of a child against the party
or enforce its order if the rights of others and the interests of justice so require.
(F) EFFECT OF TEST RESULTS. - If the court finds that the conclusions of
all the experts as disclosed by the evidence based upon the tests are that the
alleged father is not the father of the child, the question of paternity, parentage
or identity of a child shall be resolved accordingly. If the experts disagree in their
findings or conclusions, the question shall be submitted upon all the evidence.
Id. (emphasis added). This is the present form of the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to
Determine Paternity. Although it has been amended since its original enactment in 1961,
the changes are irrelevant for purposes of this discussion.
43. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5104.
44. Id.
45. Turek, 458 A.2d at 563.
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Hardy.46 The court began its analysis by reasoning that although
the Act did not include a provision allowing the admissibility of
blood test results as evidence of the likelihood of paternity, the Act
did not preclude admissibility of blood tests to show the likelihood
of paternity on general relevance grounds.47 Although the
Pennsylvania Superior Court held that blood test results were
admissible as evidence of paternity, the holding was limited in that
the blood tests could not be considered conclusive evidence of
paternity.4 8 The court supported the limitation on its holding by
reasoning that, absent an enactment by the General Assembly
making the blood tests conclusive evidence of paternity, blood tests
could only be regarded as part of the evidence establishing
paternity.49 The court concluded its opinion by stating that the
admissibility of blood tests to establish a likelihood of paternity is
in no way meant to restrict a defendant's right to challenge the
accuracy of the results and the procedures employed in obtaining
those results.50
The combined effect of the Act and the holding in Turek v.
Hardy, is that blood tests can be admissible for both sides involved
in a paternity suit. Furthermore, blood tests can be used both as
conclusive evidence of non-paternity and as part of the evidence to
establish a likelihood of paternity.51
46. 458 A.2d 562 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983).
47. Id. at 565.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 565 n.6.
50. Id. at 565.
51. Turek, 458 A.2d at 563. With regards to DNA tests, the General Assembly has
approved their admissibility in paternity suits. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4343 (1991) provides,
in relevant part,
(C) GENETIC TESTS. -
(1) Upon the request of any party to an action to establish paternity, the court
shall require the child and the parties to submit to genetic tests.
(2) Genetic test results indicating a 99% or greater probability that the alleged
father is the father of the child shall create a presumption of paternity which
may be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence that the results of the
genetic tests are not reliable in that particular case.
1996]
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III. The Doctrine of Presumption of Legitimacy
A. Description and Underlying Rationale of Doctrine
The doctrine of presumption of legitimacy is used to describe
the "presumption that a child born to a married woman is the child
of the marriage, and therefore of the woman's husband."52 The
basis of this presumption is the courts' desire to preserve the basic
building block of society-the family unit.53 Through this doc-
trine, the courts attempt to protect the best interests of the child by
insuring that the child's family remains intact.54
B. Application of Doctrine in Context of Paternity Challenge
"The presumption that a child born during wedlock is the child
of the marriage, . . ., is one of the strongest presumptions known
to the common law."55  Anytime the paternity of a child born
during wedlock is challenged, the first issue is the applicability of
the doctrine of the presumption of legitimacy.56 The only fact
necessary to trigger the presumption is that the couple was married
when the child was born.57
Once the presumption has been triggered, the burden is on the
opposing party to rebut the presumption by clear and convincing
evidence.5  Traditionally, in order to successfully rebut the
52. John M. v. Paula T., 571 A.2d 1380, 1383 n.2 (Pa. 1990).
53. Commonwealth ex rel Goldman v. Goldman, 184 A.2d 351, 354 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1962); see Commonwealth ex rel. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 136 A.2d 451, 453 (Pa. 1957) (stating
that a presumption of legitimacy is necessary where the family unit lies at the very heart of
society).
54. Scott v. Mershon, 576 A.2d 67, 70 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); John M., 571 A.2dat 1386;
Commonwealth ex rel. O'Brien, 136 A.2d at 453.
55. McCue v. McCue, 604 A.2d 738, 739-40 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); John M., 571 A.2d at
1380; Scott, 576 A.2d at 67; Jones v. Trojak, 586 A.2d 397 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); Minnich v.
Rivera, 506 A.2d 879 (Pa. 1986); Commonwealth ex rel. O'Brien, 136 A.2d at 451; Cairgle
v. American Radiator Standard Sanitary Corp., 77 A.2d 439 (Pa. 1951).
56. McCue, 604 A.2d at 740.
57. Christianson v. Ely, 568 A.2d 961, 963 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); Scott, 576 A.2d at 72.
58. McCue, 604 A.2d at 741 (stating that presumption is given almost as much force as
substantive law); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989); John M., 571 A.2d at 1380
(Pa. 1990); In re Young, 364 A.2d at 1307 (Pa. 1976); Donnelly v. Lindenmuth, 597 A.2d
1234 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991), Scott, 576 A.2d at 67; Seger v. Seger, 547 A.2d 424 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1988); Ware v. McKnight, 534 A.2d 771 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987); In re Montenegro, 528
A.2d 1381 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987); Commonwealth ex rel. Ermel v. Ermel, 393 A.2d 796 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1978).
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presumption of legitimacy, a party had to either present evidence
of a husband's lack of sexual intercourse with his wife during the
relevant period (non-access) or proof of the husband's impo-
tence.59
In 1961, the Pennsylvania legislature attempted to relax, to
some degree, the presumption that a child born during wedlock is
the child of the marriage.6° The legislature did so by passing the
Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity.61 The Act
provides that the presumption has been successfully overcome if
the medical experts unanimously agree that the results of the blood
tests conclusively show that the husband could not have possibly
fathered the child in question.62 In other words, the Pennsylvania
legislature intended to permit parties to utilize blood test results
that conclusively established non-paternity (with 100% accuracy) as
sufficient evidence to successfully rebut the presumption of
legitimacy.
In summary, when a child is born during wedlock, the
presumption of legitimacy automatically becomes applicable and
can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary. If the presumption has not been successfully rebutted,
then, in the eyes of the law, no need for further inquiry exists since
the husband is presumed to be the father. On the other hand, if
the presumption has been overcome, and the doctrine of estoppel
is inapplicable, blood tests become admissible to determine
paternity.
C Areas of Discord Among the Courts in Applying the
Presumption
Although the foregoing principles seem rather simple, courts
have had difficulty in applying them. The presumption of legitima-
cy has not been applied consistently; therefore, it has failed to
59. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 124; Jones, 634 A.2d at 206; John M., 571 A.2d at 1384;
Burston v. Dodson, 390 A.2d 216 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978); Commonwealth ex rel. O'Brien, 136
A.2d at 451; Cairgle, 77 A.2d at 439.
60. John M., 571 A.2d at 1384-85; Nixon v. Nixon, 511 A.2d 847 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
61. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5104 (1991). The Act states the following:
(G) EFFECT ON PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY
The presumption of legitimacy of a child born during wedlock is overcome if the
court finds that the conclusions of all the experts as disclosed by the evidence
based upon the tests show that the husband is not the father of the child.
Id. See also 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5104(c), (e), (f) (1991).
62. John M., 571 A.2d at 1384-85 (Pa. 1990); Nixon, 511 A.2d at 847.
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produce results with any degree of certainty. The two main areas
of discord among the courts are: (1) determining what type of
evidence is sufficient to overcome the presumption of legitimacy;
and (2) determining to what extent, if any, the Uniform Act on
Blood Tests to Determine Paternity serves to relax the presumption
of legitimacy.
1. Determining the Type of Evidence Necessary to Rebut the
Presumption. -A recurring concern of the Pennsylvania courts is
the quantum of evidence that will suffice in order to prove a
husband's non-access, or lack of sexual intercourse, during the
period of conception. Pennsylvania courts are unable to draw a
clear line establishing how much evidence of non-access is sufficient
to overcome and rebut the presumption of legitimacy. The courts
do seem to agree, however, that proof of non-access need not be
absolutely certain.63 Since the courts have provided minimal
guidance on this issue, they have essentially left it up to the trier-
of-fact to resolve the issue.'
The only guidance that the Pennsylvania courts have provided
is that the presumption of legitimacy will not survive a challenge
merely by some proof of sexual intercourse between the husband
and wife during the relevant time period.65 Otherwise, if the trier-
of-fact accepts the evidence of access as true, the presumption
would be irrefutable.66 On the other hand, if the trier of fact does
not believe the evidence of access, even if that evidence has not
been contradicted by the opposing party, the presumption has been
overcome if the evidence of access is of "overwhelming weight., 67
This leads to the next logical question of how much evidence
a trier of fact requires in order to overcome the presumption of
legitimacy. Under certain circumstances, such as when there has
been uncontradicted testimony by a party regarding the husband's
impotence during the time the child was conceived, the trier-of-fact
has not had any difficulty in finding that the presumption has been
63. Burston v. Dodson, 390 A.2d 216, 221 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978) (holding that one only
needs "exceedingly strong" or "overwhelming" evidence of non-access); Cairgle v. American
Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., 77 A.2d 439, 442 (Pa. 1951); Commonwealth ex rel.
Goldman v. Goldman, 184 A.2d 351, 354 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1962); Commonwealth v. Shepherd,
6 Binn. 283, 288 (Pa. 1814).
64. Burston, 390 A.2d at 221-22.
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overcome.68 However, more often than not, the facts which give
rise to a paternity suit are not so clear-cut and easily determined.
The usual scenario seems to be one in which a genuine question
exists regarding evidence of sexual intercourse, or lack thereof,
between a husband and wife during the period of conception. In
cases such as these, the determination of whether the presumption
has been overcome is, in essence, a question that depends on which
witnesses the trier-of-fact finds to be more credible.
For example, in Burston v. Dodson,6 9 the husband testified to
having sexual intercourse with his wife twice during the relevant
time period. ° His testimony was then corroborated by two other
witnesses.71 In addition, the child's birth certificate listed the
husband as the father and no attempt had ever been made to
change the document.72 The alleged father, a third party standing
outside the marriage, countered the husband's testimony.73 His
testimony tended to show that he, the alleged father, helped to
support the wife and all of her children and was involved with the
wife and her children on a daily basis.74
Under these circumstances, the trier-of-fact found that the
presumption of legitimacy had been successfully rebutted by
overwhelming evidence of paternity.75 It reached that conclusion
despite the fact that there was testimony that the husband not only
had access, but that he also had actual intercourse with his wife
during the period of conception.76
In a somewhat analogous case, the Pennsylvania Superior
Court in Everett v. Anglemeyer77 held that the presumption of
legitimacy had not been overcome.78 In that case, the parties
divorced before the child was born. The child's birth certificate
listed the alleged father as the natural father, and, prior to
68. Jones v. Trojak, 634 A.2d 201 (Pa. 1993).
69. 390 A.2d 216 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978).
70. Id. at 218.
71. Id. at 218-19.
72. Id. at 218.
73. Id. at 219-20.
74. Burston, 390 A.2d at 217-18.
75. Id. at 222.
76. Id. at 223-25 (Van der Voort, J., dissenting). The dissent felt that the appellant
failed to supply sufficient evidence capable of overcoming the presumption of legitimacy.
Id.




commencement of the suit, the court granted the alleged father
visitation rights. During the course of the paternity suit, the wife
had equivocated concerning which man was in fact the biological
father of the child in question.79 The court held that, since the
alleged father failed to offer any evidence that the husband did not
have access to his wife at the time of conception, the presumption
of legitimacy had not been overcome.'0
From these examples, the arbitrariness of the application of the
presumption becomes evident. Indeed, given the same set of facts,
two courts could possibly come to two different conclusions
regarding the issue of a husband's non-access to his wife. This
certainly will lead to results which are both inconsistent and unjust
for the parties involved in disputes over paternity.
Since no bright line standards or rules exist governing the
application of the presumption of legitimacy, the parties involved
in a paternity challenge are left without any guidance that would
allow them to discern their rights and responsibilities. The parties
are unable to know with any degree of certainty how the law views
their parental rights. This uncertainty exists because, as the above
examples show, courts examining two closely related set of facts
can reach inconsistent conclusions, thereby granting the parties
involved two contrary sets of rights and responsibilities. Parties
similarly situated at the onset should also be similarly situated
following the court's disposition of the matter. Any other outcome
is arbitrary and unjust.
2. Determining the Extent to Which the Uniform Act On
Blood Tests to Determine Paternity81 Serves to Relax the
Presumption of Legitimacy. -The second area of discord among
the Pennsylvania courts is determining to what extent, if any, the
Act relaxes the presumption of legitimacy. The Act itself specifi-
cally addresses its effect on the presumption of legitimacy.82 It
does so by providing that "[t]he presumption of legitimacy of a
child born during wedlock is overcome if the court finds that the
conclusions of all the experts as disclosed by the evidence based
79. Id. at 1254-55.
80. Id. at 1255.
81. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5104 (1991).
82. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5104(g).
[Vol. 100:4
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upon the tests show that the husband is not the father of the
child.
83
In the past decade, Pennsylvania courts have struggled with
this provision of the Act. The underlying question the courts have
been forced to address is whether the presumption of legitimacy
could be overcome by blood tests which conclusively established
non-paternity, even though the party was otherwise unable to
overcome the presumption through the common law means of non-
access or impotence. The Pennsylvania courts have answered this
issue in a wholly inconsistent manner.
For example, the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Parenti v.
Parenti8' concluded that, under the Act, the husband had the right
to admit blood tests in order to prove non-paternity and, thus, to
overcome the presumption of legitimacy without having to prove
either non-access or impotence. Likewise, the Pennsylvania
Superior Court in Nixon v. Nixon85 held that the husband was
permitted to admit blood tests which showed that he was not the
father of the child in question even though the husband was
otherwise incapable of defeating the presumption of legitimacy
through proof of non-access or impotency.86 The court elaborated
further by stating that "the trial court's statement that the 'pre-
sumption can only be overcome by proof of facts establishing non-
access . . . .' is an incorrect statement of the law" because the Act
provides an additional method to overcome the presumption.87
Even more recently in Jones v. Trojak,88 the Pennsylvania
Superior Court reiterated its approval of the holdings stating that
the Act provides an additional or alternative means by which an
alleged father could overcome the presumption of legitimacy
83. Id.
84. 397 A.2d 1210 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (holding that lower court erred in refusing to
admit blood tests which would have bastardized the child in question).
85. 511 A.2d 847 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
86. Id. It should be noted at this point, that subsection (g) of the Uniform Act on
Blood Tests to Determine Paternity, 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5104(g) (1991), only applies to
those situations in which test results are admitted in order to conclusively establish non-
paternity. It does not include those situations in which test results are admitted as some
proof of paternity. Id. at 850 n.5; see also Turek v. Hardy, 458 A.2d 562, 565 n.6 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1983).
87. Nixon, 511 A.2d at 850.
88. 586 A.2d 397 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
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without first having to supply overwhelming evidence of non-access
or impotency.
8 9
Various other decisions, however, have cast doubt on the
authority of the previously mentioned cases. First, John M. v.
Paula T,90 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained that the
Act relaxes the presumption of legitimacy to some extent, because
it specifically provides that the presumption "is overcome if the
court finds that the conclusions of all the experts as disclosed by
the evidence based upon the tests show that the husband is not the
father of the child." 91 However, the court explained that the Act
does not give a putative father92 the right to compel the presump-
tive father (the husband) to submit to blood tests without first
proving non-access or impotency by clear and convincing evi-
dence. 93
The second case which questions the extent the Act serves to
relax the presumption of legitimacy is Scott v. Mershon.94 Unlike
John M. v. Paula T, in Scott a mother, rather than a putative
father, attempted to disprove that her husband had fathered the
child born during their marriage.95 The mother admitted blood
test results of herself, the child and the putative father as evidence
of the putative father's paternity.96  The court held that the
mother had failed to overcome the presumption of legitimacy by
common law means (i.e., proof of non-access or impotency).97
Therefore, paternity was not a relevant fact under the Act,98 and
89. Id. at 399.
90. 571 A.2d 1380 (Pa. 1990).
91. John M., 571 A.2d at 1383 (Pa. 1990) (quoting 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5104(g)).
92. A putative father is defined as "[tihe alleged or reputed father of a child born out
of wedlock." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1237 (6th ed. 1990).
93. John M., 571 A.2d at 1388. Although the holding in this case questions the extent
to which the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity relaxes the presumption
of legitimacy, it seems to have limited application to those instances in which a third party
(a putative father) claims to be the father of a child born in wedlock and who wishes to
compel the husband (the presumed father) to undergo blood testing to discredit the
husband's claim of paternity. Id.
94. 576 A.2d 67 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
95. Scott, 576 A.2d at 68-69.
96. Id. at 68.
97. Id.
98. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5104(c) (1991) states in relevant part: "(c) Authority for test.
-In any matter subject to this section in which paternity, parentage or identity of a child is
a relevant fact the court ... may . . . order the mother, child and alleged father to submit
to tests ... ." Id.
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the mother had no right to compel the parties to submit to blood
testing.99
The court in Scott appeared to reach its conclusion without
closely examining the explicit language of the Act and without
regard to any previous cases interpreting the Act."° The court
failed to cite any authority whatsoever to support its conclusion
that the presumption of legitimacy must be successfully rebutted by
common law means before parties may be ordered to undergo
blood testing.'01 Rather, the court decided the case on policy
grounds without even considering prior case law. 2 The court
reasoned that admitting the results of blood tests would not benefit
the child in any fashion but would only serve, instead, to disrupt
the family unit."°3
Although public policy may be a legitimate ground on which
to rest a decision, it should not be the sole basis. A court should
not ignore precedent and legislative intent in reaching its decision.
A court should instead begin by analyzing the law, and then
attempt to incorporate social policy considerations. It should not
make new law without first examining the old law. If it does so, it
necessarily disregards the legally established rights of the parties
involved.
The third case which questions the extent to which the
presumption of legitimacy is relaxed by the Act is McCue v.
McCue." In McCue, the court stated that its analysis of prior
case law on the subject led it to the inescapable conclusion that a
"blood test itself may not be used to rebut paternity in the first in-
stance."10 5  It further explained that the Act does not relax the
"common law requirement of proving non-access or impotence" in
order to overcome the presumption of legitimacy." A blood test
99. Scott, 576 A.2d at 68.
100. See Faust v. Faggart, 594 A.2d 660, 664 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Scott, 576 A.2d at 70.
104. 604 A.2d 738 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
105. Id. at 741.
106. Id. at 741 (holding that "the only relaxation of the common-law rule as to rebutting
the presumption of legitimacy is the requirement that a parent could not 'bastardize' his/her
child by testifying to non-access"). Prior to 1975, neither the husband nor the wife was
permitted to testify as to non-access to overcome the presumption of legitimacy. In 1975,
that rule was abandoned by the court because it believed that the rule "lack[ed] a basis in
good sense or in sound public policy." Commonwealth ex rel. Savruk v. Derby, 344 A.2d
624, 627 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975).
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becomes relevant to the determination of paternity only when the
presumption (that a child born during wedlock is a child of the
marriage) is overcome by clear and convincing evidence of non-
access or impotence. 17
D. Effect of Discord Among the Courts on the Rights of the
Parties
Given the foregoing split of authority, the question remains
about how the aforementioned decisions affect the rights of the
parties involved in a paternity suit. This is a difficult question to
answer because in the last few years (1990-1992) the Pennsylvania
Superior Court has been unable to reach a consensus on the
matter.'"° Although the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania briefly
addressed this issue in the case of John M. v. Paula T,"° the
Superior Court has had difficulty interpreting that decision. n °
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has yet to reach a result which
is supported by a court sitting en banc." t
The question of what extent, if any, the Act relaxes the
presumption of legitimacy has yet to be explicitly answered by the
Pennsylvania courts. The trend however, seems to be toward the
decisions reached in McCue v. McCue'12  and in Scott v.
107. McCue, 604 A.2d at 741.
108. Compare Faust v. Faggart, 594 A.2d 660 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) and Jones v. Trojak,
586 A.2d 397 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (holding that blood tests that conclusively disprove
paternity may be used as additional or alternative means by which a party could overcome
the presumption of legitimacy without first having to supply overwhelming evidence of non-
access or impotency) with McCue v. McCue, 604 A.2d 938 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) and Scott
v. Mershon, 576 A.2d 67 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (holding that the presumption of legitimacy
must first be overcome by clear and convincing evidence of non-access or impotency before
paternity becomes a relevant question under the Uniform Act on Blood Tests To Determine
Paternity).
109. 571 A.2d 1380 (Pa. 1990) (holding that the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to
Determine Paternity does relax the presumption of legitimacy to some extent because it
specifically provides that the presumption "is overcome if the court finds that the conclusions
of all the experts as disclosed by the evidence based upon the tests show that the husband
is not the father of the child"). See also 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5104(g) (1991).
110. See supra note 108.
111. The Superior Court has yet to address the issue by a court en banc. Rather, it has
only addressed the issue sitting in panels of three judges. Faust v. Faggart, 594 A.2d 660
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (Beck, Popovich and Hoffman, JJ.); Jones v. Trojak, 586 A.2d 397 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1990) (Wieand, McEven and Hudock, JJ.); McCue v. McCue, 604 A.2d 738 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1992) (Cirillo, Tamilia and Ford Elliott, JJ.) and Scott v. Mershon, 576 A.2d 67
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (Olszewski, Johnson and Hoffman, JJ.).
112. 604 A.2d 738 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
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Mershon."3 In order to have authority to order and/or to admit
evidence of blood test results under the Act, the presumption of
legitimacy must first be overcome by common law means, that is,
by clear and convincing evidence of either non-access or impotence.
Even if a party has successfully overcome the presumption of
legitimacy, that party must overcome yet another obstacle, the
doctrine of estoppel, before blood tests may be admitted as
evidence of paternity or non-paternity.
IV. The Doctrine of Paternity by Estoppel
A. Description and Underlying Rationale of the Doctrine
The doctrine of estoppel is a doctrine of "fundamental fairness
designed to preclude a party from depriving another of a reason-
able expectation when the party inducing the expectation albeit
gratuitously knew or should have known that the other would rely
upon that conduct to his or her detriment."" 4 The doctrine is
invoked in order to preclude a party from asserting a right against
another who has justifiably relied upon the second party's conduct
and, as a result, has changed position. If the second party were
allowed to repudiate the prior conduct, the first party would suffer
irreparable harm because of that repudiation." 5
B. Application of Doctrine in Context of a Paternity Challenge
In the context of a paternity suit, the doctrine of estoppel is
applied to prevent a presumptive father (the husband), or the
natural mother (the wife), from denying the husband's paternity if
the couple has resided together as husband and wife and the
husband has held the child out as his own." 6 The burden is on
the party invoking the doctrine to establish its applicability by
"clear, precise and unequivocal evidence." ' 7 If the party assert-
ing the doctrine meets its burden of proof, the issue of blood tests
simply becomes irrelevant since, in the eyes of the law, paternity
113. 576 A.2d 67 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); see also Everett v. Anglemeyer, 625 A.2d 1252
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
114. Commonwealth ex rel. Gonzalez v. Andreas, 369 A.2d 416,418 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976).
115. In re Young, 364 A.2d 1307, 1314 (Pa. 1976); Blofsen v. Cutaiar, 333 A.2d 841, 843
(Pa. 1975); see also Sabino v. Junio, 272 A.2d 508, 510 (Pa. 1971).
116. Jones v. Trojak, 634 A.2d 201 (Pa. 1993); John M. v. Paula M., 571 A.2d 1380 (Pa.
1990).
117. Nixon v. Nixon, 511 A.2d 847, 849 n.4 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
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has already been established by estoppel and no further inquiry is
necessary."' 8 On the other hand, if the doctrine of paternity by
estoppel does not apply, the parties will be permitted to go forward
with the case and will be allowed to support their claims with
evidence of blood test results."9
C. Difficulty with Application of the Doctrine
The problem presented by the doctrine of paternity by
estoppel lies in determining the sufficiency of the evidence supplied
by the interested or involved parties. Deciding if the presumptive
father has held the child out as his own has proven to be a difficult
task for the Pennsylvania courts. The courts have not been
provided with any standard against which to evaluate a party's
claim of paternity by estoppel. Thus, the courts have decided the
issue on a case-by-case basis. The following cases serve to illustrate
this problem.
In Jones v. Trojak,12° testimony was provided which tended
to show the following: Mr. and Mrs. Jones held themselves out as
being the parents of the child; Mr. Jones took his wife to the
hospital and was the party responsible for giving consent to his
wife's having a Caesarean delivery; Mr. Jones' medical insurance
was used to pay for the birth of the child; Mr. Jones was named as
the father of the child on both the child's birth certificate and the
child's baptismal certificate; and Mr. Jones never suggested to
anyone that he was not the father of the child."'
Despite this testimony which tended to show that the presump-
tive father held the child out to be his own, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court decided that this evidence was insufficient to estop
118. John M., 571 A.2d at 1386; see, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Palchinski v. Palchinski,
384 A.2d 1285 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978); Commonwealth ex rel. Gonzalez v. Andreas, 369 A.2d
416 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976).
The doctrine of paternity by estoppel is codified in 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5102(B)
(1991). The statute states that one of the three ways to determine paternity is "[ilf, during
the lifetime of the child, it is determined by clear and convincing evidence that the father
openly holds out the child to be his and either receives the child into his home or provides
support of the child." 23 PA. CONS. STAT, at § 5102(B)(2). Although this particular
enactment speaks directly to the use of the doctrine in the context of children who are born
out of wedlock, the doctrine is applied with just as much, if not more, rigor in the context
of children who are born during wedlock. See Commonwealth ex rel. Gonzalez, 369 A.2d at
416.
119. Jones, 634 A.2d at 206.
120. 634 A.2d 201 (Pa. 1993).
121. Id. at 205.
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the husband from challenging paternity; thus, he was permitted to
proceed with his claim with the aid of a blood test."2 The court
based its decision on the fact that Mr. and Mrs. Jones had divorced
sometime following the filing of the paternity suit and therefore
"no intact family considerations [were] present" to prevent the
taking of blood tests."
In contrast is the case of McCue v. McCue,24 a case factually
similar to Jones. In McCue, the court held that the wife was
estopped from denying that her husband was the father of the child
in question."z  The evidence presented in the case tended to
establish the following: Mr. and Mrs. McCue held themselves out
to the general public as being the parents of the child; Mr. McCue
assisted in the delivery of the baby; the child lived with Mr. and
Mrs. McCue until their separation; Mr. McCue had never publicly
denounced his paternity; and Mr. McCue had financially supported
the child in question) 26  The court supported its decision by
reasoning that it is not plausible for a mother, upon separation, to
be able to challenge her estranged husband's paternity when the
child was born during wedlock and when the husband held the
child out as his own. 127
Although the cases of Jones and McCue are factually similar,
the courts have reached two contrary conclusions for no apparent
reason. In their analyses, both courts utilized the fact that the
husband and wife were separated or divorced at the time that the
case came before the appellate court.128 In Jones the court used
that fact to justify the admissibility of blood tests;129 in McCue the
court used that fact to exclude evidence of blood tests.
130
A second example of the inconsistent application of the
doctrine of paternity by estoppel can be seen in the following two
cases. In the case of Zadori v. Zadori,3 testimony was provided
which tended to show that Mr. Zadori knew the child was not his
on the date the child was born; that despite this, Mr. Zadori agreed
122. Id. at 207.
123. Id. at 207.
124. 604 A.2d 738 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
125. Id. at 742-43.
126. Id. at 742.
127. Id.
128. Id.; Jones, 634 A.2d at 201.
129. Jones, 634 A.2d at 207.
130. McCue, 604 A.2d at 742-43.
131. 661 A.2d 370 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
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to list himself as the natural father on the child's birth certificate;
and that Mr. and Mrs. Zadori lived together in a family unit for
three years following the child's birth, during which time Mr.
Zadori fed, clothed, housed and provided for the child's emotional
needs.'32 Based on this evidence, the Pennsylvania Superior
Court held that the husband was estopped from denying paterni-
ty.'33 The court reasoned that Mr. Zadori, by his conduct, had
established a parental relationship with the child which he could
not revoke upon his leaving the marital residence and, therefore,
blood tests were inadmissible to disprove paternity."'
In contrast is the factually similar case of Kohler v. Bleem,135
in which the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the husband
was not estopped from denying that he was the father of the child
in question. 36 Prior to marrying Mrs. Kohler, Mr. Kohler had
been voluntarily sterilized; when Mrs. Kohler became pregnant she
told her husband that the father of the child was a stranger living
somewhere in Buffalo.137 Despite the circumstances, Mr. Kohler
accepted the child into his home, held the child out as his own and
financially supported the child. 38 Only upon learning, five years
later, that the biological father was, in fact, a next-door neighbor
did Mr. Kohler deny paternity.'39
In diverging from a long line of cases supporting application of
the doctrine of paternity by estoppel under these circumstances, the
court permitted Mr. Kohler to deny paternity.'4° The court
refused to apply the doctrine based on the following three grounds:
(1) clear and convincing evidence was offered to rebut the
presumption of legitimacy; (2) the party seeking to invoke the
estoppel was guilty of fraud and/or misrepresentation in not
revealing the true identity of the biological father; and (3) an intact
family unit no longer existed which needed protection.
41
Although the cases of Zadori and Kohler share a common
factual background, the Pennsylvania Superior Court has reached
132. Id. at 372.
133. Id. at 373.
134. Id.
135. 654 A.2d 569 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
136. Id. at 577.
137. Id. at 570-71.
138. Id.
139. Kohler, 654 A.2d at 571.
140. Id. at 577.
141. 654 A.2d 569.
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two opposite conclusions for no sound reason. In both cases, clear
and convincing evidence was offered to rebut the presumption of
legitimacy and there was no longer an intact family unit. 42 The
only distinction that the court utilized to justify differing results is
that, in Kohler, Mr. Kohler was operating under the assumption
that a stranger had fathered the child and if he had known
otherwise he would have immediately left the marital residence.
143
Allowing a husband to deny paternity because the biological
father was a neighbor rather than a stranger, as his wife had
initially stated, ignores the underlying issue in the application of the
doctrine of paternity by estoppel. "The fact that [the husband]
became aware of the true identity of the alleged father is irrelevant
to the issue of estoppel. It is knowledge of and acceptance of non-
paternity that creates the estoppel; lack of knowledge as to the true
identity of the [biological] father is irrelevant."'"
This type of judicial inconsistency carries with it ramifications
for involved parties, attorneys, and judges alike. If courts reach
contrary conclusions in factually similar cases, there is no clear
measuring stick with which to determine the paternity of children
born during coverture. Parties will be forced to view their parental
rights with uncertainty, attorneys will be forced to litigate most
cases based on mere speculation, and judges will be forced to
decide each paternity challenge on a case-by-case basis without any
guidance. All of this will result in an abandonment of judicial
economy.
A second problem presented by the doctrine of paternity by
estoppel is that it has replaced scientific certainty with what is best
labeled as legal fiction. The end result is that it has forced courts
to label a man as the legal father of a child when, in fact, it can be
conclusively proven that the man is not the child's biological father.
Also, it has forced courts to ignore evidence of extremely high
probabilities of a man's paternity in exchange for a determination
of paternity reached through the intuition of a judge or a jury.
For example, in the case of Chrzanowski v. Chrzanowski,4 s
the husband was estopped from denying his paternity of the child
in question even though the lack of sexual intercourse with his wife
142. Zadori v. Zadori, 661 A.2d 370, 374 (Beck, J., concurring).
143. Kohler, 654 A.2d at 576.
144. Id. at 578 (Tamilia, J., dissenting).
145. 472 A.2d 1128 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
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was stipulated to, the wife's testimony excluded her husband as
being the natural father, and the blood test results conclusively
proved that the husband could not possibly be the father of the
child.1" The Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the husband
was estopped from denying paternity because he lived with the
child and his wife for three years and he supported the child during
that time.147
According to this analysis, at the very moment that the
husband doubted his paternity he should have abandoned his
family and stopped supporting the child. This is what the court
suggests that a party should do in order to avoid being estopped
from denying paternity in the future. This message seems very
ironic since one of the underlying goals of the doctrine of estoppel
is to preserve the family unit.1" Although in theory, the doctrine
of paternity by estoppel has a sound policy basis, in application the
doctrine seems to transgress its underlying notion and thus present
serious problems.
In sum, once the presumption of legitimacy has been over-
come, if a party wishing to invoke the doctrine of estoppel provides
sufficient evidence, that is, evidence that the husband has continu-
ously held the child out to the public as his own, the doctrine of
paternity by estoppel will apply and will prevent the denial of the
husband's paternity. At this point, blood tests are irrelevant
because paternity has already been established in the eyes of the
law. However, if the doctrine of estoppel is found to be inapplica-
ble, the paternity suit will go forward and blood tests will be
admissible either as some evidence of paternity or as conclusive
evidence of non-paternity.
146. Id. at 1132.
147. Id.
148. Commonwealth ex rel. Goldman v. Goldman, 184 A.2d 351, 354 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1962); see Commonwealth ex rel. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 136 A.2d 451, 453 (Pa. 1957).
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V. Problems with the Application of the Doctrines of
Presumption of Legitimacy and Paternity by Estoppel in the
Context of Paternity Challenge
A. Misapplication of the Doctrine of Estoppel
The doctrine of estoppel arises when a person, either through
his acts or omissions, "intentionally or through culpable negli-
gence" '149 misleads another into believing and justifiably relying
on a certain set of facts. The person who has changed his position
based on this reliance will be prejudiced if the other person is
permitted to subsequently deny the set of facts.15° From this
description it can be seen that the doctrine is only available to
someone who did not know or could not have known the true state
of affairs. Furthermore, the doctrine is only available to a party
who has suffered irreparable harm as a result of the reliance on the
misrepresentation.
The application of this doctrine in the context of a paternity
dispute, in some cases, seems to be based on a misconception of
the notion of estoppel. Consider the situation where a husband
wishes to introduce the results of blood tests which prove his non-
paternity, but his wife invokes the doctrine of paternity by estoppel
and prevents him from denying paternity. Further assume that the
husband did not know that he was not the biological father until
one day after he had divorced his wife, when someone approached
him about the matter and planted a seed of doubt in his mind.
This reliable source would have approached the husband earlier but
feared the information would break up the marriage.
This set of facts serves to illustrate how the doctrine of
estoppel has been misapplied by the courts. The doctrine of
equitable estoppel was designed to prevent someone from promot-
ing his own self-interest, either through fraud or through other
blameworthy conduct.151 If this is true, the courts should not
149. Culpable negligence is defined as the "[flailure to exercise that degree of care
rendered appropriate by the particular circumstances, and which a man of ordinary prudence
in the same situation and with equal experience would not have omitted." Culpable conduct
is conduct which is blameworthy and reprehensible. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 379, 1033
(6th ed. 1990).
150. Pennsylvania ex rel. Gonzalez v. Andreas, 369 A.2d 416, 420 (1976); BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, 538-39 (6th ed. 1990).
151. In re Young, 364 A.2d 1307, 1314 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976) (Pomeroy, J., dissenting).
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apply the doctrine to prevent a husband from denying his paternity
when the husband is not guilty of any intentional or culpable
conduct. During the time that the husband in the above example
misrepresented the fact that triggered the doctrine, that is, holding
the child out as his own, he was acting under an honest belief that
he was in fact the biological father.
Furthermore, the doctrine of estoppel was designed to protect
innocent parties who justifiably relied on a set of facts because they
did not or could not have known any better. Therefore, a mother,
who obviously knows or should know the identity of the natural
father, should not be able to claim that she justifiably relied on and
changed her relative position based upon the fact that the husband
held the child out as his own. The mother's knowledge of the true
state of affairs should prevent her from using the doctrine of
estoppel to her benefit.
B. Legal Fiction Favored Over Scientific Certainty
Another problem presented by both the doctrine of paternity
by estoppel and the doctrine of presumption of legitimacy is that
the doctrines combine to create a legal fiction. In the eyes of the
law, a man can be determined the legal father of the child even
though blood tests conclusively show that the man could not have
possibly fathered the child. In addition, a man can be declared the
legal father of the child, even though blood tests show there is a
99.99% probability that another man is the biological father of the
child in question. 52
Despite the availability of scientific evidence that can establish
biological paternity with a high degree of certainty, in some
instances, the law ignores this evidence. This problem was best
illustrated in the dissent of Justice Chidsey when he said, "To hold
that a 'presumption' establishes a fact in the eyes of the law is not
only to look upon justice as blindfolded, but to blind her by the
law's own hand."' 53 With regard to blood tests which exclude the
possibility of paternity, Justice Chidsey went on to say, "The very
nature of a 'presumption' is to permit it to be rebutted by clear
evidence to the contrary, and no evidence known to the judicial
152. Smith v. Shaffer, 515 A.2d 527 (Pa. 1986).
153. Commonwealth ex rel. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 136 A.2d 451,455 (Pa. 1957) (Chidsey,
J., dissenting).
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process is more lucid and scientifically certain than the blood
grouping test when used to negate paternity."'"
C. Erosion of the Rationale Underlying the Doctrine of
Presumption of Legitimacy
The doctrine of presumption of legitimacy was created in order
to accomplish two basic goals. First, it was designed to prevent a
child from being labeled illegitimate, because being labeled as an
illegitimate child subjected a child to "significant legal and social
discrimination." '55 Second, it was designed to preserve the basic
building block of society, the family unit.156 Through utilization
of the doctrine, the courts have attempted to preserve the familial
relationship."5 7
The first goal, to prevent the stigma attached to the status of
an illegitimate child, has already been accomplished by the
legislature;158 thus, the presumption of legitimacy is no longer
necessary for that purpose. The legislature accomplished this goal
by eliminating the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate
children through the following enactment: "All children shall be
legitimate irrespective of the marital status of their parents, and, in
every case where children are born out of wedlock, they shall enjoy
all the rights and privileges as if they had been born during the
wedlock of their parents .... " 9
With regard to the second goal, to keep the familial relation-
ship intact, the presumption of legitimacy does not always serve its
purpose. When the paternity of the husband becomes an issue, it
is more likely than not that the sanctity of the family unit has
already been destroyed. The paternity question itself will usually
sever the familial relationship, and it is doubtful that the presump-
tion of legitimacy has the power to mend that relationship. This is
154. Id.
155. John M. v. Paula T., 571 A.2d 1380, 1384 n.2 (Pa. 1990); see, e.g., Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989); Cairgle v. American Radiator Standard Sanitary Corp., 77
A.2d 439 (Pa. 1951); Robert Auwers, Equal Protection and the Illegitimate Child, 21 HOUS.
L. REV. 229 (1984).
156. Commonwealth ex rel. Goldman v. Goldman, 184 A.2d 351, 354 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1962); see also O'Brien, 136 A.2d at 453 (stating that the presumption of legitimacy is
necessary where the family unit lies at the very heart of society).
157. Scott v. Mershon, 576 A.2d 67,70 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); John M., 5751 A.2d at 1386;
O'Brien, 136 A.2d at 453.




especially true when the husband is the one bringing suit to deny
paternity.
D. Parties Rights Determined on a Case-By-Case Basis
Due to the inconsistent application of the doctrine of presump-
tion of legitimacy and paternity by estoppel, the parties involved in
a paternity suit, especially the presumptive father and the alleged
father, are forced to view the laws that govern their rights with
uncertainty. With regard to the application of these doctrines in
the context of a paternity suit, there are no concrete rules or
standards governing their administration. The rights of an alleged
father and of a presumptive father are decided based upon the
specific facts of the case, leaving the courts without any framework
on which to base their analysis. In the following section, solutions
to this and other problems raised by the doctrines will be discussed.
VI. Proposed Solutions
The first problem is determining the extent, if any, the
Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity relaxes the
presumption of legitimacy. Within a two year time period (1990-
1992) four different panels of the Pennsylvania Superior Court have
been split on the issue, two taking one position and two taking the
opposite position. It is certainly time for legislative intervention in
this area.
The Pennsylvania legislature needs to take an affirmative
stance and provide clarification of its intent to the Pennsylvania
courts. The General Assembly should amend the section of the
Blood Test Act that deals with its effect on the presumption of
legitimacy by turning the right to admit blood tests as conclusive
evidence of non-paternity into an absolute right. The legislature
should also include in its amendment a provision stating that blood
tests which show non-paternity with 100% accuracy are allowed as
evidence to rebut the presumption of legitimacy, even if a party is
incapable of rebutting the presumption by common law means.
The second problem is the absence of any definitive guidelines
for the Pennsylvania courts in applying both the doctrine of
presumption of legitimacy and paternity by estoppel. With regard
to the presumption of legitimacy, there needs to be some type of
clearly defined standard against which to measure evidence of non-
access. Then, at least, the courts will know what evidence can be
used to determine the issue of non-access. This will hopefully result
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in more consistency and uniformity in the outcomes of paternity
disputes. These standards will also serve to define the burden of
clear and convincing evidence.
A standard for determining non-access may resemble some-
thing similar to this model: (1) Were Mr. and Mrs. Smith living
together during the period of conception?; (2) Was the status of the
overall relationship good or bad?; (3) Did Mr. or Mrs. Smith
communicate any information regarding their sexual or non-sexual
relationship to any third party?; and (4) Was there any evidence
presented that either Mr. or Mrs. Smith was involved in an extra-
marital relationship?
The evidentiary problems associated with the presumption of
legitimacy also hold true with regard to the doctrine of paternity by
estoppel when deciding the quality and quantity of evidence that is
necessary in order to invoke the doctrine. The present standard of
a husband's holding a child out as his own may mean one thing to
one person and something else to another. Being a father may
carry with it different meanings depending upon the person
interpreting it. The standard needs to be more explicitly defined
in order to prevent the courts from having to speculate on the
matter.
The following standard would prove helpful to the courts: (1)
Was Mr. Smith present for the delivery of the child?; (2) Did Mr.
Smith financially support the child?; (3) Did Mr. Smith participate
in physically caring for the child?; (4) To what extent was Mr.
Smith involved in the child's overall life?; and (5) Did Mr. Smith
ever publicly denounce his paternity?
If the Pennsylvania courts would adhere to the above proposed
standards then at least all cases would be decided on an equal
footing and all similarly situated parties would possess the same
rights and responsibilities under the law. Utilization of these
proposed standards would help prevent arbitrary application of the
doctrines of presumption of legitimacy and paternity by estoppel
and would lead to more consistent results in paternity disputes.
VII. Conclusion
Both the doctrines of presumption of legitimacy and paternity
by estoppel had noble goals when they first came into existence.
Since that time, those goals have been forgotten and the continued
application of the doctrines has done more harm than good.
Pennsylvania courts have been unable to agree on the application
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of the doctrines, and, as a result, have been unable to render
consistent decisions. Attorneys have been forced to view the laws
governing their client's rights with uncertainty, parties who are
similarly situated have not been accorded the same rights and
responsibilities under the law, and judges have been forced to
decide outcomes on a case-by-case basis thereby sacrificing judicial
economy and increasing the risk of arbitrariness.
It is time for legislative intervention into this area. Common
law guidelines and legislation, such as proposed above, must be
utilized in order to meet the mandates of justice. If this is not done
then all participants in a paternity challenge will suffer as a result.
The only other alternative is to completely eliminate the
doctrines of presumption of legitimacy and of paternity by estoppel.
This is not an unreasonable suggestion given the technological
progress made in the past few decades regarding to blood testing.
If these doctrines were eliminated then the paternity of a child
born during wedlock could be established with scientific certainty
rather than with legal fiction.
Whether the Pennsylvania courts or Legislature elect to modify
the existing doctrines or eliminate them completely, it is evident
that some change is necessary. Until either body acts, "justice" will
become an obsolete term to the parties challenging the paternity of
a child born during wedlock.
Heather Faust
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